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Abstract
Using firm-level panel data, this paper exposes differences in the dynamic oil produc-
tion regime between private and state-owned firms. I find that state-owned firms reduce the
oil supply, ceteris paribus, by 3.5 percent each year, but private firms hold output constant.
Furthermore, state-owned firms have not followed such stringent policy before 1997. My ex-
tension of the Hotelling-model attributes the behavior of state-owned firms to a scarcity rent,
whereas private firms produce at their constant capacity limit, owing to possible expropriation.
The theory also indicates that state-owned firms will only switch to a Hotelling-regime after a
certain lag time, attributable to limited capacity. The data further reveals that contractions in
the supply of state-owned oil lead to oil price increases, indicating that state-owned firms do,
in fact, generate a scarcity rent. My results therefore suggest that the shift from private towards
state-owned oil dominance in the 1970s gave rise to a delayed increasing oil price path.
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†Corresponding author. Tel.:+41 (0)61 267 33 59 ; fax:+41 (0)61 267 32 51 ; Postal address: Peter Merian-Weg 6,
Postfach, CH-4002 Basel.
1
1 Introduction
For nearly a decade now, the sustained crude oil price rally has been fueling the fear that there is
no going back to cheap oil in the near future. The price rally originates from the dramatic demand
shift, caused by new heavyweight emerging economies with high income elasticities of oil demand
like China and India, and from the sluggish oil supply response of the oil producers. In view of this
situation, one primarily wonders at what price the supply side will be able and willing to satisfy
the rising world oil demand.
Economic implications arise from the risk that the high oil price might hamper economic recov-
ery after the recent recession. Moreover, the peaking oil price in 2008 was arguably a driving force
behind the recession itself (Hamilton, 2009a), and as crude oil is the backbone of large areas of
economic activity, the oil price affects the economy through various channels (Lee and Ni, 2002).
In order to assess the relevance of oil, Figure 1 displays yearly average crude oil expenditure1 as
a share of GDP, in US dollars, for several countries and aggregates. Starting in 2000, the world
spent about 2.6 percent of its income on oil. This share increased subsequently with the exploding
oil price and peaked at around 5 percent during the financial crisis. The prominent position of oil
is based on its low price elasticity and in the case of developing countries, on an income elasticity
that is near unity (Hamilton, 2009b). The income elasticity declines with economic development
and is thought to be around 0.5 percent for OECD countries.
Scrutinizing the supply side more closely reveals that far more than half of today’s oil produc-
tion is controlled by national oil companies, and almost 90 percent of all proven oil reserves are
owned by national oil companies (EIA, 2009). This is in stark contrast to the situation four decades
ago, when oil production was predominantly in private hands. Thus, the question at what price oil
will be supplied in the future boils down to the ability and the willingness of national firms and
their governments.
Given this shift from a private-dominated oil market towards an overwhelming dominance of
national firms, I explore in this paper to what extent differences between (multinational) private
firms and national firms under government control can explain oil price increases. My regression
analysis exploits a firm-level panel data set of the 50 largest oil firms, which accounted on average
for nearly 75 percent of the world oil supply during the sample period 1987-2010.
The data reveals three key points. First, by the mid-1990s the Hotelling rule emerged as a
dominant factor governing the oil supply of fully state-owned firms2 which provide the bulk of oil
to the world market. Second, private firms differ from national firms, since they do not follow a
Hotelling regime, but produce at a constant level at their capacity limit. Finally, national firms,
1The data on the oil consumption is taken from the BP-Statistical Review of World Energy 2011.
2From here on, state-owned, refers to 100-percent state ownership. In this study, I use the term national and
state-owned interchangeably.
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Figure 1: Average yearly expenditure (US $) on oil as share of GDP (US $) (1986-2010)
which in large part emerged through expropriation in the 1970s, did not follow a Hotelling path
immediately after formation, but only after a certain lag time of constant oil production. The
evidence suggests that it is not the peak-oil effect or the inefficiency of national firms that are
the driving forces behind the oil price increase, but instead the shift (in 1970-1984) from private
towards state-owned oil dominance and the subsequent emergence of a scarcity rent in case of
national firms, which result in an increasing oil price path.
In particular, I find that the sluggish supply response is the result of a ’visible hand on the tap’
(The Economist, 2007) policy of national firms, that limit their oil supply in order to generate a
Hotelling rent. National firms and their respective governments exacerbate the oil price rally by
successively reducing the oil supply by a yearly rate of 3.5 percent according to my regression
estimates. On the other hand, I find that national firms did not realized a scarcity rent before the
mid-1990s, but produced at their given capacity limit, ceteris paribus. The same holds true for
the case of private firms. Here, I show that private firms produce at their capacity limit during the
whole sample period and hence do not follow the Hotelling rule at all.
To support the empirical analysis, I present a simple stylized model that builds on Hotelling
(1931). My model allows for market decomposition into private firms and state-owned firms,
where the former face expropriation, but the latter do not. The theoretical framework facilitates
the interpretation of the empirical results. The regression analyses show that private firms produce
at a constant rate, ceteris paribus. Within the model, this is due to the expropriation date which
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limits the time horizon of the firm. The data also reveals that state-owned firms, which do not
face an expropriation date, are homogenously3 on a declining production path from 1997 onwards.
According to the theory, this follows from the Hotelling rule, where the shadow price has to in-
crease according to the interest rate. The theory further suggests that national firms initially, after
formation, produce at a constant rate before following a Hotelling path. Thus, the model is able to
explain why national firms switch to a Hotelling path only after a certain lag time. I also show that
starting in the mid-1990s the declining extraction path of national firms successively resulted in a
price increase, which is consistent with the theoretical model.
Moreover, the theoretical model allows for the following casual interpretation of the historical
oil price development:
In an initial period with private firm dominance, the oil price remains constant (until the 1970s).
This is followed by a period of heavy oil supply disruption, as the market dominance shifts from
private to state-owned firms (in the 1970s). Finally, after market consolidation and a period of con-
stant oil production, the state-owned firms move towards a Hotelling path and oil price increases
(starting from the mid-1990s). Figure 2 in the appendix depicts these mechanisms.4 This agrees
with the well documented fact that the shift from private to state-owned oil indicates a remarkable
change within the oil industry (Kobrin, 1984; Victor et al., 2012).
Thus, in the case of the oil industry, the Hotelling rule is a quite recent phenomenon, simply
because the state-owned firms of net-exporting countries have evolved more recently.5 This is in
line with the casual conclusion of Hamilton (2009b); and the finding of Lin (2011) that the shadow
price has increased in recent years. It is also consistent with the rise in the income share spent on
oil consumption starting in 1998 (Figure 1). Thus, the dominant position of national firms in the
oil industry combined with the scarcity rent do not raise hope for falling oil prices in the long run.
The key contributions of this study are therefore threefold: (a) I show that the Hotelling rule
is a dominant factor in the decision process of national oil firms; (b) but not for private firms; (c)
I further present theoretical and empirical evidence that national firms did not follow a Hotelling
regime before 1997, which explains why a Hotelling price path could not be observed immediately
after the shift from private to state-owned oil supply dominance.
My work is related to different strands of literature (empirical work on the Hotelling rule,
studies on national oil firms and theoretical work extending the Hotelling model) which will be
discussed in the following.
3In a statistical sense.
4It is important to stress that the model, of course, does not account for short-term oil market shocks like the
Iran-Iraq war (1980) or demand contractions, for example, through the European sovereign debt crisis, but depicts the
long-run mechanisms.
5Most state-owned firms of net-exporter countries evolved in the 1970s and early 1980s, major exceptions are
Mexico and Iran. However, both did not provide oil to the world market until the 1970s (Kobrin, 1984).
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This study is related to the empirical literature testing the Hotelling model for the non-renewable
resource sector. Livernois (2009) gives a thorough review of this topic. However, empirical evi-
dence on the Hotelling rule is mixed. Focusing on a U-shaped price path, evolving through tech-
nological progress, Slade (1982) finds support for the Hotelling model. In contrast, Berck and
Roberts (1996), using a more sophisticated ecometric technique find no U-shape and hence no
support for the Hotelling rule. Looking at the development of the shadow price, Adelman and
Watkins (2005) find no rise in the latter and hence reject the Hotelling rule for the oil sector. For
a more recent period, however, Lin (2011) demonstrates an increase in the shadow price of oil,
indicating support for a scarcity rent. The most convincing evidence on the Hotelling rule stems
from data on non-renewable resources outside the oil market (e.g., stumpage prices for Old-Growth
forests (Livernois et al., 2006)). However, to the author’s knowledge no literature dealing with the
Hotelling rule on the firm level in the case of the oil industry exists and, in particular, with the
differentiation along the line of state-owned and private firms. Therefore, my results contribute to
this branch of literature by identifying the decomposition of the oil sector into private and national
firms as a crucial factor for the empirical application of the Hotelling model.
Due to their dominant position in the oil sector, extensive literature exists on the topic of state-
owned oil firms outside the Hotelling literature. Two prominent studies are the PESD study edited
by Victor et al. (2012) and the World Bank study of Tordo et al. (2011) which focus on peculiarities
of the individual state-owned firm. The World Bank and PESD reports attempt to evaluate the
efficiency of different national firms in a broader, not purely economic, context.6 My study draws
heavily on the historical case studies in this literature for the stylized facts presented in Section 2.
Both studies stress the point that significant variation between state-owned firms exist, and aim to
determine its cause. Even though, state-owned firms come in various forms (Tordo et al., 2011, Vol.
I, p. 22), I add to this literature by identifying the Hotelling rule as an underlying economic pattern
which is a general mechanism, in a statistical sense, attributable to all state-owned firms. Thus,
despite the numerous idiosyncratic features of individual state-owned firms, there is a common
economic driver: the Hotelling rent. My study further, in particular the stylized facts in Section 2,
draws on Kobrin (1984) who gives a thorough summary of the first wave of expropriation in the
1970s, resulting in the establishment of most national oil firms which provide the bulk of world oil
supply today.
That private and state-owned firms differ systematically in terms of production has been noted
by Johany (1979) and Mead (1979). Especially, when expropriation is evident, private firms tend
to increase oil production. Belonging to this strand of literature, there exist various studies on the
efficiency differences between private and state-owned firms. Eller et al. (2010) find that national
6The studies move beyond efficiency in a pure economic sense, but also take the multi-dimensional challenges
faced by national oil companies into account, such as social contributions.
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firms are less efficient than their private counterparts. The empirical analysis conducted below is
connected to the empirical study by Wolf (2009), who employs the same dataset, but without the
period 2007-2010, and examines the effect of state-ownership on efficiency. In contrast to Wolf
(2009), my empirical analysis concentrates on the effect of the market decomposition into private
and state-owned firms on the dynamic behavior of the oil production path for the respective firms.
That is, I use the qualitative predictions of my theoretical model to test for a Hotelling regime in
the case of state-owned firms, which is not addressed in Wolf (2009). He finds that national firms
produce at a significantly lower level compared to private firms, using pooled data on the gas and
oil supply. In contrast to Wolf (2009), my results for the oil sector suggest that state-owned firms
produce at a higher level than private firms, taking the Hotelling rent into consideration.7 I also
include additional country-specific variables (e.g., a corruption index) and time dummies in my
analysis.
Further, it has been shown before by Long (1975), that firms facing a limited time horizon will
produce at a constant rate. The main difference to the theoretical work by Long (1975) is that my
model endogenizes the expropriation decision of the country. Thus, it depicts a complete picture
of the decision interactions of the state and the firm and their effect on the oil supply over time.
My work is also related to more general discussions of national oil companies (Adelman, 2002;
Stevens, 2008).
Finally, my findings relate to studies reporting structural breaks in the price path of natural
resources; e.g., Lee et al. (2006).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I present some historical examples which em-
phasize that the assumptions of the theoretical model are based on stylized facts found in real life.
Section 3 presents the theoretical model. Section 4 presents a casual interpretation of the oil price
path. Section 5, Section 6 and Section 7 describe the data and report the empirical findings. Section
8 presents robustness checks of the link between theory and empirics, and Section 9 concludes.
2 Stylized Facts
The stylized facts presented here, serve as the point of departure for the theory and as a tool to
evaluate the model assumptions in a historical context of the oil industry. These stylized facts
mainly relate to the state-owned firms that emerged with the first wave of nationalizations in the
1970s, and, in the case of Norway in the early 1980s which provide the bulk of world oil supply
today.8 Thus, almost all national firms of this period evolved from some kind of expropriation
7In turn, when not controlling for the Hotelling rent effect, my results are similar to Wolf (2009).
8Before I proceed, it is necessary to clarify the following concept. In this study, I use the term expropriation
(nationalization) in the sense of a transfer of decision-making power in the oil production process from a private firm
to the state akin to Stevens (2008) concept of resource nationalism, defined as greater national control over natural
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process (Victor et al., 2012, p. 6).9 However, the pattern outlined below emerges again in the case
of national firms in the former USSR. It is further important to stress that I concentrate in this study
on national firms of net-exporting countries. In other words, firms that add to the world oil supply
and hence affect the world oil price directly.
During the era of the ’seven sisters’ (around 1950-1970), most oil was produced by private
enterprises. The seven sisters were a cartel of private firms which exerted almost total control
over the oil market (Victor et al., 2012, p. 5). In particular, the emergence of a world oil market
is closely associated with these private firms, since before WW II international trade in oil was
insignificant (Adelman, 2002; Wyant, 1977). However, in the wake of a first wave of resource
nationalism, starting in the Middle East during the 1970s, governments began to assume control of
their oil production. This has often been achieved by means of a state-owned oil company. In other
words, before nationalization in the 1970s, only 1 percent of world oil reserves were in the hands
of state-owned firms (Victor et al., 2012, p. 6). Today, almost 90 percent of the world’s reserves are
owned by state-owned firms (EIA, 2009). After the re-strengthening of private oil firms’ market
power, due to resource privatization in the former Soviet Union and a surge of consolidations in
the oil industry through ’super-mergers’, a second expropriation wave hit the oil industry more
recently, as Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Russia increased the prevalence of state-control by
expropriating private owners and investors (Engel and Fischer, 2008). Thus, the history of state-
owned oil firms, which add significantly to the world oil supply, is young and commenced in the
1970s (Kobrin, 1984).10
I now present two strands of stylized facts: (i) case studies of countries, describing the transition
from private to state-owned oil production. (ii) the knowledge transfer from private to state-owned
firms.
(i) The transition from private to state-owned oil production has occurred frequently in the
history of the oil industry and explains the origin of almost all national firms today. In Mexico,
for example, oil production shifted through expropriation from private hands to the then state-
owned oil company Petromex.11 A similar pattern emerged in the case of Saudi Arabia, when the
Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) started oil production in Saudi Arabia in the 1930s.
It was initially owned and privately controlled by Standard Oil of California (Socal), but was
resource development. This shift might take place through outright expropriation of the firm’s capital equipment
and/or drilling rights, by the financial acquisition of the firm’s capital equipment and/or drilling rights or by enforced
state participation in the oil producing process (e.g., Norway used enforced production sharing contracts). As the
differentiation is not important here, because all that matters is the shift in decision-making power or greater national
control, I will not distinguish and use the concept of expropriation as described above.
9An exception is, for example, the Brazilian Petrobras (Victor et al., 2012).
10Notable exceptions are Mexico and Iran, but neither Pemex nor NIOC supplied oil to the world market before the
1970s (Kobrin, 1984).
11Mexico expropriated in the late 1930s, but had no access to the world oil market until the 1970s.
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subsequently taken over by the Saudi Arabian government and is today completely state-owned
and controlled. More recently, the Russian government incorporated the former private firm Yukos
into the national company Rosneft.
Accordingly, it is possible to decompose the oil industry into two parts: on the one hand, private
firms that operate in a country under a finite time horizon until expropriation, and which do not
expect to fully exhaust the oil reserves of their host country; on the other hand, national firms that
operate domestically within a much longer time horizon subsequent to expropriation.
The observations give rise to a simplified two-stage economic order. A country starts to pro-
duce oil at a given oil price level. Starting oil production from scratch is difficult and expensive
for two reasons. First, large sunk investments (exploration and extraction installations) have to
be made. This was especially true in the 1970s, when international private oil companies had a
considerable technological advantage (Kobrin, 1984) and is generally true in the case of develop-
ing countries which lag in up-front investment. Second, technical and commercial know-how in
producing oil has to be acquired, which relates, in particular, to indigenous human capital. Thus,
it is much more convenient to employ specialized private firms to explore oil fields and to develop
oil production facilities on-site.12 This is often accomplished by means of a production sharing
agreement (PSA).13 I label this initial period, where a country gives concessions to private firms
which make sunk investments and start to produce oil, the first stage in a country’s oil producing
process. During this initial period the country also accumulates know-how in oil production and
the oil business which will be discussed in (ii).
Once this first stage is accomplished, the country starts pushing for increased participation in
the oil production process. Finally, the country annexes the control of the oil production process
completely or at least extensively. With the shift of control, the second stage is reached. Usually,
there is a considerable elapse of time between the commencement of private oil production and
the shift to state control; and usually a national oil company is involved in this transfer of control.
Norway and Venezuela can be used to exemplify this two-stage process.
Norway initially awarded drilling licenses for the Norwegian Continental Shelf to private firms.
In this initial period throughout the 1960s, private companies were fully responsible for the devel-
opment of the oil fields and the oil production. In 1972, Norway enforced its participation in the
oil production process via the newly established NOC Statoil14 (Øystein Noreng, 1980). The shift
from private oil production to state-controlled oil production took much longer in Venezuela. Oil
production in Venezuela started in the early 20th century and was conducted by private firms on
12Indeed, history delivers few accounts of countries establishing their oil industry, independently, from scratch. One
such example is Brazil and its national firm Petrobras (Tordo et al., 2011, Vol. II, p.56)
13A PSA is a contract that grants the exclusive right to explore and produce oil in a given area and for a given period.
Thus, the time horizon is limited, since extension of the contract is uncertain.
14Even today after privatization, 67 percent of Statoil are state-owned.
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concession15 until the nationalization of the oil industry and the creation of Petroleos de Venezuela
in 1976 (Wilpert, 2003; Victor et al., 2012, p. 423).
(ii) The transfer of know-how from private firms was fundamental for successful entry into the
oil market, for almost all major national firms active today. That is, activity in the oil business
requires not only technical but also managerial and organizational capacities which national oil
firms to a great extent acquired from private firms (Kobrin, 1984; Marcel and Mitchell, 2006, p.
30). As a consequence, we can associate national firms with a ’learning function’. Thus, there was
usually a period where private firms and state-owned firm activity within a country overlapped and
a know-how transfer from private towards national firms took place (Marcel and Mitchell, 2006,
p. 29). I now give four examples of this kind of know-how transfer, where an important factor was
the accumulation of oil sector-specific human capital:
Algerian’s national firm Sonatrach was founded in 1963 and was initially a partner to private
firms in major hydro carbonate projects (Victor et al., 2012, p. 561). It was only after several years
and its nationalization in 1971 that Sonatrach had accumulated sufficient know-how to operate the
Algerian oil sector on its own (Tordo et al., 2011, Vol. II, p. 108).
Similarly, Norwegian Statoil was established in 1972 and acquired its managerial and technical
capacity thorough the state enforced partnership with private firms in almost all oil production
projects in Norway (Victor et al., 2012, p. 637). This enabled Statoil to accumulate know-how by
learning through its interaction with private firms.
Venezuela took a different route in gaining the know-how transfer from private firms. It en-
forced employment regulations which made sure that private firms hired and trained local workers
(know-how transfer). Thus, by the time of nationalization almost all private oil sector employees
were Venezuelan which joined the newly established state-owned PDVSA in 1975 (Victor et al.,
2012, p. 425). As a consequence, PDSVA draws heavily on its private sector heritage (Victor et al.,
2012, p. 425).
The Venezuelan example bears a resemblance to Saudi Arabia. The private oil company
Aramco which was active in Saudi Arabia started to train and employ local workers at all organi-
zational levels, as a reaction to nationalization movements in neighboring countries (Victor et al.,
2012, p. 179). Furthermore, Aramco helped to jump-start the industrial modernization of Saudi
Arabia. All in all, the relations of the private Aramco cooperation with the Saudi Arabian state
were positive, enabling a smooth transition from private hands to state-ownership (Saudi Aramco).
As a consequence, by the time of Aramco’s full nationalization, little changed within the company
itself, and most of the company’s know-how and staff were retained (Marcel and Mitchell 2006, p.
30; Victor et al. 2012, p. 181).
15There was a change in Venezuela’s tax policy in the 1940s.
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3 The Model
In this section, I develop a simple model to assess the implications of the oil market decomposi-
tion into private and state-owned firms. The model is an extension of the basic Hotelling model
presented in Hotelling (1931). The main purpose of the theory presented here is to support the
argument outlined in this study and to deliver qualitative predictions that can be used for data anal-
ysis. Thus, while the model is sophisticated enough to provide useful results for this purpose, it
is also sufficiently simple to ensure tractability. Importantly, it is sophisticated enough to carve
out an economic theory which is able to, despite being highly abstracted, explain and connect the
three key points revealed by the data: (a) private firms produce at a constant rate; (b) national firms
produce initially at a constant rate; and (c) national firms switch towards a Hotelling regime only
after a certain lag time. The model further abstracts from any idiosyncratic level effects concerning
state and national oil firms, since this study is interested in an underlying general economic mecha-
nism and as will be discussed below (Section 6), these effects are accounted for in the econometric
analysis.16
The model’s two key assumptions, which are the existence of a learning function and the fact
that most national firms today originated owing to (or are linked to) expropriation, build on the
stylized facts presented in Section 2. Before proceeding, it has to be acknowledged that the model
is purely descriptive, which allows me to assign a well-founded economic theoretical mechanism
to the three key points outlined in this study. However, the model would be overtaxed if one
intended to derive predictions of the long-run future oil price, since it does not incorporate demand
adaption to oil price increases and further neglects technological progress, affecting both demand
and supply.
The model consists of a supply side and a demand side. The demand side is expressed by an
isoelastic demand function, which captures the world oil demand. This assumption is based on
the fact that crude oil prices around the world are heavily cointegrated (Chen et al., 2009). In the
interests of tractability and for simplicity, the world oil reserves are owned by a single country (oil
monopoly).17 Starting at time zero, under a set of predetermined economic and political covari-
ates, the country offers a formal contract to a private firm. This contract includes the unconditional
lease of the oil reserves to the firm, the date of expropriation, and the tax rate (not unlike a PSA).
The formal expropriation includes the transfer of the firm’s sunk investment to the state. There is
no informal expropriation, say, for example, in the form of a subsequent tax-rate increase. Thus,
there is a commitment to the expropriation date and the tax rate. During the period in which the
16Such level effects include corporate governance, cultural identity, historical background as well as the individual
scope of objectives (if time invariant).
17However, due to the functional form of the model, the equilibria of perfect competition and pure monopoly
coincide (Stiglitz, 1976).
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private firm is active, the country increases its know-how in oil production and the oil business.
The spillover effect is captured by a learning function, which is increasing in time until expropri-
ation.18 The country’s cumulated know-how, in turn, determines the country’s capacity limit for
oil production and can be treated as a stock variable. More formally, the know-how transfer might
be part of the concession contract; e.g., as a training program for the local population, which is
a common contractual detail. Hence, the country offers the contract, including expropriation date
and tax rate, under perfect information and is aware of the firm’s cost function and optimal sunk
investment as well as its own covariates.
A single private firm obtains the concession from the country, places its one-time investment
(sunk costs) and starts producing oil. This one-time investment can be interpreted as the fixed real
capital necessary for oil extraction. It also sets an upper bound on the maximal production capacity
in such a way that the private firm cannot extract total oil reserves at once. This assumption is
suitable, because production capacity is important in the oil industry, which requires significant
lead time to increase (Hamilton, 2009b). The firm is fully aware of the expropriation date (no
uncertainty) and the tax rate, but cannot influence these. This lack of bargaining power might be
interpreted as a pool of potential contracting parties made up of homogeneous firms, which induces
a ’price taking’ behavior.19
After expropriation, the country produces oil at its own expense by means of a state-owned
firm.
3.1 The firm
There is a world demand for oil, given by the inverse isoelastic demand function
P (t) = B u(t)−1/h,
with P (t) the price at time t, B is some positive constant, u(t) the oil supply, and h > 1 the
elasticity of demand.20 The static isoelastic demand function simplifies the analysis, because the
equilibrium prices in a pure monopoly and perfect competition without variable costs coincide
(Stiglitz, 1976). Thus, I concentrate in the following on the one-country one-firm case which still
allows me to derive implications for the case of perfect competition. It has to be acknowledged,
though, that the world oil demand has increased in recent decades. However, the econometric setup
18Not strictly increasing though, as will be discussed below.
19Since uncertainty is not a model feature, the private firm will only place a one-time investment. Excluding
uncertainty in terms of the expropriation date simplifies the analysis considerably, but is a strong assumption which
might not hold in reality. Introducing uncertainty might lead to the successive investment behavior of the private firm
instead. However, such a model extension lies outside the scope of the present paper.
20The isoelastic demand function requires the restriction of h > 1 or otherwise no production takes place. This is a
caveat of the isoelastic demand, since in reality the long-run oil demand elasticity is thought to be smaller than 1.
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below allows me to control for possible demand shifts by holding the oil price constant, so that the
assumption of a static demand function does not confer complications affecting the theoretical
model’s predictions.
World oil reserves are owned by a single country, denoted by the subscript L. Before time zero,
there is no oil production and no oil industry in the country. At time zero, the country issues an oil
extraction concession to a single private firm, henceforth termed firm, identified by the subscript F .
The oil supply is given by u(t) = DuL + (1−D)uF , where D is zero in the first stage (private firm
producing) and one after expropriation. Furthermore, let X(t) denote the stock of oil remaining in
the ground at time t:
X(t) = X0 −
∫ t
0
u(s) ds.
The private firm then has to solve the dynamic programming problem, given by
VF = max
uF ,KF
∫ T
0
B uF (t)
1− 1
h (1− g) e−rt dt − KF φ
s.t. 0 ≤ uF (t) ≤ KF
X˙(t) = −uF (t)
X(t) ≥ 0 ∀ t ∈ [0, T ] and X(0) = X0,
(1)
where VF is the value function, with the first term of the right-hand side being the discounted profit
flow and r the discount rate. g introduces a tax rate relative to the prevailing price, payable to the
state. I assume that there are no variable costs, so that revenues after taxes equal profits. There are
unit fixed costs given by φ. KF is the one-time sunk investment which determines the upper bound
for the extraction rate. Accordingly, line two in Eqs. (1) is the control space restriction faced by
the firm. The equation of motion for the oil stock X(t) is associated with the shadow cost of the
in-ground unit oil. The initial oil stock is X(0) = X0, and the stock of oil is not allowed to become
negative. Finally, the time horizon of the optimization problem is limited by the expropriation date
T . In order to obtain the optimal solution to the problem in Eqs. (1), it is first necessary to inspect
the interior solution (see Appendix):
Lemma 1. The interior solution to the problem of Eqs. (1) is given by
uF (t) =
KF ∀t ∈ [0, TS(F )]e−h r t (B Y (1−g)cF )h = e−h r (t−TS(F ))KF ∀t ∈ [TS(F ), T ], (2)
with Y = h−1h , cF being a positive constant
21 and TS(F ) being the switching point from constant
oil production towards a Hotelling path for the firm’s extraction policy.
21Since the price cannot be smaller than zero, the constant has to be positive.
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Lemma (1) gives the best feasible extraction policy for the interior of the control domain which
has to be compared with the boundary points.
Proposition 1. Assuming X(T ) = X0 − T K˜F = X0 − T
(
B (1−g)Y e−r T (er T−1)
rΦ
)h
> 0 and g < 1,
where K˜F is the solution to the capacity limit problem of Eqs. (1) and Y = h−1h , it is optimal for
the firm to produce at the capacity limit u(t) = K˜F ∀ t ∈ [0, T ]. Further, g < 1 implies that VF > 0.
Prop. 1 shows, similar to Long (1975), that the firm will produce a constant stream of oil as
long as it cannot fully exhaust the oil reserves until T and as long as there are some profits. If g < 1
does not hold, the firm will not become involved in the country.
Proof. To prove Prop. 1, it is sufficient to show that the corner solution is superior to the interior
solution given by Lemma 1, under the same KF and T . Economically speaking, the production at
the capacity limit must yield higher profits than the extraction policy of the interior solution which
induces a declining extraction path. For the proof, define:
V CF =
∫ T
0
B(1− g)KF (t)1− 1h e−rtdt
V IF =
∫ TS(F )
0
B(1− g)K1−
1
h
F e
−rtdt+
∫ T
TS(F )
B(1− g)KYF e−r(h(t−TS(F ))+TS(F ))dt,
(3)
where V CF is the value function for the constant extraction until T , and V IF is the value function
for the interior solution. Here TS(F ) indicates the point at which the optimal regime shifts from
maximum productionKF to the optimal declining extraction path of the interior solution (Seierstad
and Sydsaeter, 1986, p. 69). We require that V CF ≥ V IF ∀TS(F ) ∈ [0, T ]. Writing Eqs. (3) as an
inequality, evaluating the integrals and substituting T − i for TS(F ) results in:
B (1− g) ((h− 1) ehir − h e(h−1)ir + 1)KYF e−r((h−1)i+T ) ≥ 0.
Because g < 1, the inequality above is satisfied as long as (h− 1) ehir − h e(h−1)ir + 1
= Y ehir − e(h−1)ir + 1h ≥ 0 holds. But this is true ∀ i ∈ [0, T ]. Further, Lemma 2 (Appendix) shows
that VF > 0 in this case.
The firm additionally solves the static problem of the optimal sunk investment, which deter-
mines the oil production capacity limit. Substituting KF for uF in the value function of Eqs.
(1) reveals that VF is strictly monotone increasing and concave in KF . Hence, there is only one
maximum that is given by the first order condition (FOC)
B(1− g)Y K−1/hF
(
1− e−rT )
r
− Φ = 0.
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The FOC for this problem shows that the optimal sunk investment K˜F is a strictly increasing
function of the expropriation date T . The solution K˜F displays a direct link between expropriation
date T and the sunk investment of the firm. Increasing T implies a higher constant extraction rate
of the firm. On the other hand, increasing the tax rate g will reduce the sunk investment. Following
Prop. 1, the firm does not incorporate any form of scarcity rent into its depletion policy and will
extract as much oil as possible until the expropriation, given the optimal sunk investment. This
ensures maximal profits.
In this situation, we have g < 1, a finite expropriation date, constant oil production at the ca-
pacity limit, and a strict positive oil stock at T .
In the case that X|T=∞ = 0, the state does not expropriate at all. Here, the firm will behave
similar to the state-owned firm in the following subsection.
3.2 The state
At time zero, the state basically faces two possibilities, where the outcomes are measured by the
value functions V iL, i = 1, 2. Given the learning function and the tax rate g, the state can either:
V 1L : give a concession to the firm and do not expropriate (X|T=∞ = 0)
V 2L : give a concession to the firm and do expropriate (X|T<∞ ≥ 0).
(4)
In order to say something meaningful about the country’s optimization problem, it is necessary
to specify the learning function:
KL = min{a T,Kmax} with Kmax ≤ K˜F , (5)
where KL is the capacity limit of the state;22 a is some learning-multiplicator; and Kmax is the
maximum achievable know-how which might be conditioned on some economic stock variable
in the society. The restriction on Kmax is necessary to ensure the validity of the interior solution
below and will be evoked in Prop. 3. Equation (5) also links the capacity limit of the state to the
length of time in which the firm is active in the country as well as to the firm’s capacity limit K˜F .
For the time being, I concentrate on the second case and assume that X(T ) > 0. The state then
faces a two-stage optimization problem where the second stage is a dynamic optimization problem
similar to the firm. The state maximizes V 2L by choosing an optimal extraction trajectory u˜L(t) for
the oil residuum X(T ) = X0−
∫ T
0 K˜F > 0, an optimal expropriation date T˜ and an optimal tax rate
22It is straightforward to model the capacity limit as a function of the cumulated know-how.
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g˜. Using the learning function, the problem of the state becomes:
V 2L = max
uL,T,g
S(T )+
∫ ∞
T
B uL(t)
1− 1
h e−rt dt
s.t. S(T ) =
∫ T
0
B g K˜YF e
−rt
0 ≤uL(t) ≤ KL
X˙(t) =− uL(t)
X(t) ≥ 0 and X(T ) = X0 −
∫ T
0
K˜F > 0
KL = min{a T,Kmax} with Kmax ≤ K˜F ,
(6)
where S(T ) is the cumulative tax paid to the state. The restriction in the third line of Eqs. (6)
gives us the control space restriction for the state’s extraction path. This restriction is defined by
the learning function in the last line of Eqs. (6).
The state then maximizes its discounted income by choosing an optimal policy at t = 0, which
simultaneously determines the tax income in the first stage and its own oil extraction path after
expropriation in the second stage. The state controls the tax income by choosing the length of the
taxing period (expropriation date) and the tax rate. This optimal control, however, must incorporate
the effects of the expropriation date and the tax rate on the control space restrictions of the second
stage (lines 5-6 in Eqs. (6)). For example, increasing the tax income period results in an increase
in the state’s capacity limit, but decreases the remaining oil stock.
The state can control its income in the second stage by choosing an optimal extraction path,
given the remaining oil stock and the control space restriction. This control space restriction is
determined by the capacity limit of the state.
The two stage problem is solved backwards, by first choosing the optimal extraction path for an
arbitrary expropriation date and an arbitrary tax rate. Applying the Maximum Principle and using
the restrictions from Eqs. (6) gives the optimal extraction path u˜L for the second stage problem.
The control space restriction in form of the capacity limit again imposes a switching point TS(L)
on this optimal program. The oil extraction will be constant until TS(L). Afterwards, the extraction
path resembles the ‘normal’ Hotelling path, although being steeper. Similar to the interior solution
of the firm, the optimal extraction rate of the state also involves a constant, denoted as cL. It
describes the shadow price of oil for the state at t = T . The two unknowns TS(L) and cL are
determined by exploiting the oil stock restriction X(T ) =
∫∞
T u˜L dt and the fact that u˜L(TS(L)) =
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KL. The solution is hence described by the triplet:
u˜L =
KL ∀ t ∈ [T, TS(L)]u˜L = (B Y e−rscL ) h ∀ t ∈ [TS(L),∞)
cL = B Y K
−1/h
L e
1
h
− rX(T )
KL
−rT
TS(L) = −
1
hr
+
X(T )
KL
+ T.
(7)
Since this solution of the second-stage problem is similar to a dynamic problem with a control
space restriction, I omit the proofs and refer to Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1986, p. 69). However,
due to the additional first step (the tax income period) involving the choice of the expropriation
date and the tax rate, it is necessary to check for the consistency of the control space restriction
of the second stage with the first-stage solutions. In detail, the feasibility of the optimal solution
requires that TS(L) ≥ T˜ . This ensures that the capacity limit (control space) does not expand during
the second stage. Thus, the expropriation date imposes an additional restriction on the solution
space of the dynamic problem.23 The optimal extraction path, using the solution of TS(L) and cL,
yields the intertemporal maximized value function V 2L :
V 2L = S(T ) +
B e−r T (a T )Y
(
h− (h− 1) e r(K˜F T−X0)a T + 1h
)
h r
(8)
Exploiting the FOC would give the optimal expropriation date T˜ . Unfortunately, no explicit
solution is available. Hence, it is necessary to establish that such an optimal expropriation date
exists in finite time.
Proposition 2. Under the assumptions of Lemma 3 (Appendix), there exist an optimal T˜ and an
optimal g˜ which maximize case two of Eqs. (4) and for which V 2L (T˜ ) > 0 holds.
Proof. Given Lemma 3, the value function of Eq. (8) is a continuous function on a closed and
bounded domain T ∈ [0, Kmaxa ]. Thus, by the extreme value theorem, there exists at least one
T˜ for which the value function achieves its maximum. According to Lemma 4 (Appendix), the
maximized value function V 2L is non-zero and positive. This holds for a general tax rate.
Using an additional assumption, Lemma 3 shows whether the state will expropriate.
Corollary 1. Assuming Kmax ≥ K˜F g 1Y ≥ K˜F |T=∞ g 1Y , the state will expropriate and thus choose
V 2L of Eq. (4). K˜F |T=∞ is the sunk investment under the premise that the state does not expropriate
(case one), and K˜F is the optimal sunk investment of the firm in case two.
23To maintain the flow of the argument, I shall postpone the proof of this requirement until the end of the section.
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Proof. The corollary follows from the same argument as Lemma 3. Note that if T =∞, then case
V 1L applies, and the optimal extraction program, and thus the optimal tax income path, is the firm’s
interior solution. This follows from the discount rate.
Following Lemma 5 (Appendix), an optimal tax rate also exists for the problem in Eqs. (6).
The first assumption of Lemma 3 guarantees that when the maximal know-how level of the state is
reached, the state always succeeds better on its own. The second assumption ensures that the state
reaches its maximal know-how level before the oil reserves are exhausted by the firm. Under these
conditions an expropriation date exists in finite time which maximizes the discounted income of
the state and guarantees oil production under state regime. The optimal expropriation date has to
satisfy a tradeoff. On the one hand, postponing the expropriation date increases tax income, the
boundary of the state capacity limit24 Kmax, and the actual capacity limit KL. On the other hand,
it decreases the remaining oil reserves owing to the duration of operation and the capacity limit of
the firm. Because the optimal expropriation date holds for all tax rates, it also holds for the optimal
tax rate. The optimal tax rate is determined by the following interrelations: The tax rate increases
the tax income in the first stage. On the other hand, the tax rate governs the depletion rate of the
firm through its effect on the firm’s capacity limit, which affects the remaining oil stock and the
feasible boundary of the state capacity limit.
Following this argument, it is optimal for the state to give a concession (contract) to the firm
in the first stage, and then in a second stage, after expropriation, to produce oil on its own. In this
second stage, optimality requires that the state produces oil according to a Hotelling path. This
implies an oil supply contraction. The next proposition recaps the situation which prevails in the
second stage.
Proposition 3. Under the assumptions of Lemma 3, the optimal extraction policy of the state
is given by Eqs. (7). That is, the state will first produce, after expropriation at time T , at its
capacity limit KL, and then switch at time TS(L) to a declining extraction path in order to generate
a Hotelling rent.
Proof. By Eqs. (7) it remains to be shown that TS(L) ≥ T . Substituting the solution of Eqs. (7) for
TS(L) and expanding yields
X0
K˜F
− T ≥ KL
K˜F
1
hr
.
Estimating T by T ≤ Kmaxa gives the following inequalities:
X0
K˜F
− T ≥ X0
K˜F
− Kmax
a
≥ 1
hr
≥ KL
K˜F
1
hr
,
24As long as the equality Kmax = K˜F holds.
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where KL
K˜F
≤ 1 by definition and the last inequality follows by the assumption X
K˜F
≥ K˜Fa + 1hr of
Lemma 3.
Thus, according to Props. 2-3 the state will first give a concession to the firm in order to
generate tax income and to increase its own know-how (capacity limit) by learning from the private
firm. The state is not able to conduct oil extraction from scratch, as oil production requires know-
how. During this first stage, the state has to share the oil revenues with the firm or otherwise the
firm will not operate in the country. Then after the expropriation date is reached the state can obtain
higher revenues by conducting oil extraction on its own without splitting the oil revenues with the
firm. Further, the state will eventually follows a Hotelling extraction path, after an era of constant
oil supply, which induces an exponentially increasing oil price.
3.3 Summing up
The preceding theoretical model incorporates stylized facts found in the literature into a Hotelling
setup. In the model analysis I show, assuming a sunk investment, a finite expropriation date,
and a learning function of the state, and how the oil supply decomposes naturally into a two-
stage process. In the first stage, a private firm produces oil, and after expropriation in the second
stage, the state produces on its own account. Proposition 1 shows that a firm will produce oil at a
constant rate under the assumption that the expropriation takes place in finite time, and it cannot
fully exhaust the oil reserves of the host country.25 Consequently, oil output and price will be
constant during this period. The size of the sunk investment, and hence of the extraction rate,
depends directly on the expropriation date, the oil stock size and the prevailing tax rate. Here, the
model attributes the constant extraction rate of the firm to the finite expropriation date. In reality,
additional forces that contribute to such a behavior might exists; e.g., incentive of short-run profit
maximization of CEOs. This, however, does not affect the basic model mechanisms.
The expropriation date chosen by the state is characterized in Prop. 2. The model analysis
further shows that the optimal extraction program of the state after expropriation is given by a
constant extraction rate, owing to the capacity limit constraint, followed by an eventually declining
extraction rate. Hence, eventually, the state’s extraction rate will follow a Hotelling path, giving
rise to a constant relative price increase. The model, thus, implies a break in the production pattern
of the state-owned firms, at the point of constant output towards the Hotelling path. This latter
point depends, among other things, on the expropriation date and the oil stock size. This is crucial,
because a market dominated by national firms does not necessarily imply a Hotelling price path
immediately after expropriation, but only after a certain lag time.
25It seems plausible that private firms do not expect to fully exhaust the oil reserves in the host country.
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The result, in case of a one-firm-one-state setup, indicates how the market decomposition sepa-
rates the price process into a period of a constant oil price followed by a period of an exponentially
increasing oil price. The analysis further shows that this behavior is optimal to both firm and state.
Under these conditions the oil produced by private firms is cheaper.
The functional form of the model, ensures that the dynamic extraction policy in the case of
a pure monopoly (described here) and perfect competition coincide (Stiglitz, 1976). Thus, the
qualitative predictions of the model apply, for example, to a market structure dominated by a
private firm monopoly as well as to a market structure dominated by state-owned firms under
perfect competition.26 Furthermore, the isoelastic demand function ensures that national firms are
able to generate an analogous scarcity rent through supply contraction even in a market including
private firms.27
Empirical Investigation
In the next section, I first present a casual discussion of the world oil price path along the arguments
of the theoretical model and then present empirical evidence, by using a firm-level micro-panel
dataset and employing the fixed-effects panel data estimation procedure, that national oil compa-
nies limit their oil supply to generate a Hotelling rent, but private firms not. The data also reveals
that national firms exhibit a break in the oil extraction policy by switching from constant oil supply
to a Hotelling path in 1997. Thus, the main predictions of the theory indeed carry over to the data.
4 A First Look at the Price Data
From the model which describes long-run economic mechanisms, it is to be expected that in an era
which is dominated by a private firm monopoly, the oil price will be constant.28 Figure 2 shows that
the oil price is constant and even declines, given short-run shocks, during the period of the private
firms oil monopoly. The first period of constant oil supply is then followed by heavy disruption in
the oil market structure, as dominance shifted from private to state-owned oil supply. In particular,
within a decade, world oil reserves owned by national firms increased from 1 percent to 60 percent
26This might not hold in the case of static variables, like the fixed investment and expropriation date, but holds for the
dynamic extraction policy under given fixed variables. Due to the fixed effects estimator procedure, the econometrical
analysis does not depend on these static variables.
27This holds true as long as the demand curve lies above the constant part of the supply curve (private firm supply)
which seems uncontroversial, since national firms provide the bulk of the world oil supply.
28That the seven sisters exerted near perfect control over world oil supply (outside USA) and behaved like a mo-
nopolist until the 1970s is uncontroversial (Wyant, 1977; Victor et al., 2012, p. 5).
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in 1980 (Victor et al., 2012, p. 6) and are now at almost 90 percent (EIA, 2009). It is important to
note, that by 1984 the oil market was no longer dominated by a monopoly of private firms but by
competitive state-owned firms.29 In the model, this shift leads to a level oil supply contraction,30
giving rise to a jump in the oil price. After, consolidation of the oil market, the price path remained
more or less constant during a period of constant oil supply provided by national firms. The price
path then indicates a break in 1998. The theoretical model above attributes this break to a shift
from constant oil extraction to Hotelling behavior in the case of national firms which dominate
world oil supply.
5 Data
For a more detailed analysis of the theoretical model, firm level data is needed. Unfortunately, such
data is not available before 1987. However, the oil market structure during the era of the seven
sisters and the shift from private to state-owned oil is well documented. Thus, the data analysis
below concentrates on the more recent era, where the transition from private to state-owned oil
supply dominance has been completed.
The Petroleum Intelligence Weekly (PIW) publishes a compilation of the Top 50 oil-producing
firms in an annual supplement to its publication. These 50 firms make up the bulk of the world oil
supply with a market share of about 75 percent during the sample period. The ranking is based on
six operational criteria, including oil and gas reserves and production, refinery capacity and product
sales volumes. The annual supplement provides data on the six operational variables and data on
the number of employees, revenues, net incomes and total assets for each firm. Additionally, the
dataset provides information about the share of state-ownership for each listed firm and information
on the country of origin. This makes it possible to assign country-specific covariates to each firm.31
The country-specific covariates include real GDP in current international dollars,32 taken from
the World Development Indicators; the Quality of Government Index (QoGI)33 from ICRG; the
Political Rights Index (PRI) from the Freedom House Dataset; and OPEC membership. The PRI
is normalized to lie between 0 and 1, where higher values signify better institutions. The data on
the gross oil price in US dollars (Cushing, OK WTI Spot Price FOB (dollars per barrel)) is taken
from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA).
For the analysis, I obtained firm data for 1987-2010. I define a firm as state-owned when the
29That the oil market today is competitive in the case of national firms, at least for the relevant period in this study,
will be addressed below in more detail.
30The disruption of the oil market was also accompanied by short run-supply shocks.
31In the case of Royal Dutch Shell, which is located in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, I average the
country-specific variables over both countries.
32Real GDP refers to PPP adjusted GDP.
33The data is provided by Samanni et al. (2008)
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Table 1: State-owned and Private Firms Characteristics
Characterstic No. Oil Reserves Oil Production Refinery Capacity GDP p. Capita
of Obs. in mill bbls in 1,000 b/d in 1,000 b/d Host Country
Fully 445 45,074 1,656 741 13,215
state-owned
Fully/partly 712 3,801 717 1,229 23,397
private
Notes: The table shows the sample averages for fully state-owned (100 percent state ownership) and fully/partly private (not
100 percent state-owned) firms. The sample covers the period 1987-2010. In the case of the refinery capacity, the sample
is limited to 612 observations for private firms. The variable in the last column gives the GDP per capita in PPP-adjusted
international dollars for the respective country in which each firm is located.
state ownership is 100 percent. Thus, state-owned is indicated by a dummy variable which is one
if state-owned, and zero otherwise. The sample also possesses enough within (intra) firm variation
to assess the impact of a switch to full state ownership. In the case of national firms, I only include
the countries of net-exporters. This excludes national-firms from India, Austria, Italy, Peru, Spain
and Turkey; and Chinese national-firms since 1993 and Petrobras before 2006, since they do not
contribute directly to the world oil supply.
Exploiting variation at firm level allows me to decompose the oil supply market into national
and private firms, in contrast to the usual country-level assessments. This facilitates a more in-
depth insight into the dynamic behavior of the oil supply, because oil is produced at firm level.
The composition of the panel changes continuously as firms leave and enter the Top 50 ranks,
and results in an unbalanced panel. To broaden within-firm variation, I combined the firm data for
BP-Amoco and Arco, which merged in 2000, for the years 1998 and 1999.34 All in all, the sample
contains 103 firms allocated across 42 countries. The average firm remains in the sample for 11.2
years.
Table 1 reports an average breakdown of state-owned and not fully state-owned firms, labeled
private firms from here on, for the years 1987-2010. The table reveals significant differences within
the sample. While state-owned firms own oil reserves that are usually roughly ten times larger than
those of private firms, they only produce roughly twice as much oil. The private firms, in turn,
exhibit a much higher downstream involvement, which is evidenced by their refinery capacity.
The last column of Table 1 displays the average GDP per capita in international dollars for the
respective countries in which each firm is located. The data reveals significant differences in the
average per capita income for the set of countries possessing state-owned firms and the set of host
countries of private firms. These sets are not disjoint. For example, private and state-owned firms
coexist in Russia.
Unfortunately, there is no per unit oil production cost available at firm level. Thus, the analysis
below may capture the effect of higher per unit oil production costs for national firms. In gen-
34Treating these private firms separately does not alter the subsequent results.
21
eral, this caveat should be inconsequential, due to the availability of cheap oil in the Middle East
(national) and the high costs of offshore production (mostly private firms) and production from
tar sands (mostly private firms). Nevertheless, given the available data, I was not able to lift this
caveat. Using total output, revenues and net income is not feasible because of the downstream
business.
For the analysis, I construct two panels. The first contains the observations from 1998 to 2010,
and the second contains the full sample. This separation is based on the literature, which notes that
the scarcity rent in the oil market is a more recent phenomenon. For example, Hamilton (2009b)
hypothesizes that scarcity rent became a significant issue in 1998.
6 Econometric Setup
The information on the firm’s ownership facilitates the decomposition of the sample into two sub-
groups of private and national firms, respectively. This allows me to account for statistical dif-
ferences between these two groups in terms of their oil production policy, and hence to test the
qualitative predictions of the model.
Being able to track firms over time makes the application of panel data techniques feasible.
Moreover, using within-firm variation in the data eliminates the problem of firm-specific effects,
which might be correlated with the explanatory variables. This is achieved by employing the fixed
effects procedure, which wipes out the between-firm variation. Here, all time-constant firm specific
effects are captured by firm dummies. These effects include inter-firm differences in technology,
oil reserves, production efficiency and, of course, the information on state ownership as long as
there is no change within the sample period. This comes in handy, as it is reasonable to assume
that firms differ significantly with regard to these characteristics (Tordo et al., 2011, Vol. I, p.xiii).
The fixed effects estimator also wipes out any level effects concerning cultural differences, his-
torical background and corporate governance. In turn, the estimator makes use of all information
regarding time variation. Thus, if a firm increases its oil reserves during the sample period, the
fixed effects procedure will capture the effect of this on the firm’s oil production. As each firm is
attributable to a specific country, between-country variation will be excluded, and the firm location
does not matter.
It is possible, though, to assess the influence of within-country variation on the oil production
for firms located in that country. It is to be expected that within-country variation is particularly
important in the case of national firms, which are directly influenced by country-specific features.
It is empirically troublesome that the data availability of the selected variables is not homogeneous.
Adding additional variables to the regression model usually leads to a sample size reduction. How-
ever, all setups are robust to the sample reduction, meaning that if all the regression setups were
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run on the smallest sample, similar results would be obtained.35
7 Empirical Evidence
My model identifies some qualitative features of an oil industry which is decomposed into private
firms and national firms. Proposition 1 suggest that a private firm, under the assumption of static
demand and fixed oil reserves, produces at a constant rate. The constant supply is induced by the
expropriation date, and the level of the extraction rate depends on the production capacity. Further,
it is to be expected that any demand shift will be captured by the crude oil price, since oil markets
are cointegrated (Chen et al., 2009), and accordingly the firms face price processes which move
simultaneously. Thus, controlling for the price takes care of fluctuations in demand; e.g., the recent
European sovereign debt crisis.
Hence, the model suggests that private firms produce a constant output when controlling for
price effects and changes in oil reserves; in other words, holding oil price (and hence oil demand)
and oil reserves constant. This is an important point then, because the private oil supply might vary
with the oil price and oil reserve changes, but is constant conditional on these covariates and any
fixed effects. The model further suggests that the capacity limit of private firms depends, among
other things, on the fixed tax rate and the expropriation date. However, the fixed effect estimator
removes time invariant level effects.
From Prop. 2 in the theoretical model, the national firm will produce at a constant rate (the
constant phase) initially, and subsequently, after crossing the switching point, will give in to a
declining extraction trajectory (Hotelling path). Again, this behavior is conditional on the oil price
(oil demand) and covariates, but does not imply that national firms effectively reduce output on
the Hotelling path. For example, given a positive demand shock and a resulting demand-driven oil
price increase, national firms might even increase output. However, such an output increase would
fall short to the extent of the Hotelling rent, or in other words, we would observe a supply decrease
conditional on the oil price; that is, holding oil price and hence oil demand constant.
In particular, from Eq. (7) we have for t > TS(L) (switching point), taking the log:
ln(u˜L) = −h r t+ h r
(
X(T )
KL
+ T
)
− 1
˙˜uL = −h r t
(9)
where t is a time index, u˜L denotes the optimal oil production of a state-owned firm, and ˙˜uL is the
differential with respect to time. Thus, holding oil reserves and the oil price constant, we expect
35The results are further robust to the pooling of the national and the private firms sample. In other words, the results
are similar when the empirical analysis is conducted on the samples separately.
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that national firms will reduce their output at a rate similar to the adjusted discount rate h r, labeled
discount rate from here on.36
Given these conditions, the question arises as to whether the national firms on average follow
a Hotelling path and, if so, whether it is possible to identify a switching point where national
firms on average shifted from a constant towards a declining oil supply? The answer depends
heavily on the market structure of the oil sector, because the model is only applicable if the oil
sector consists of competitive national firms,37 and national firms are indeed able to cause a price
increase through supply contraction. I will address these issues in the robustness section (Section
5). The theoretical model further suggests that the oil output of the state-owned firm declines,
conditional on the covariates, by a percentage rate similar to the discount rate on the Hotelling
path. The reason for this is the price increase, arising from the supply restriction.
Using the following regression model, where i is the firm index and t a yearly time index, I set
out to test whether the qualitative effects predicted by the theory are evidenced by the data.
Oi,t = β0 + β1Di,t + β2Di,tYt + β3(1−Di,t)Yt + β′Xi,t + vi,t, (10)
with the error term vi,t = µi + ut + i,t, where µi is a country-specific effect, ut a time effect and
i,t an idiosyncratic error term. Oi,t is the log (logarithm) of the average daily oil production; Di,t
is the dummy variable for state-owned firm, which is one if state-owned and zero otherwise; Yt is a
time trend; andXi,t is a set of control variables. The control variables include firm-specific as well
as country-specific measures. The firm specific measures, all in log, include oil reserves, refinery
capacity, product sales volume, number of employees, revenues and the net income. The data on
refinery capacity and product sales volume and the data on revenues and employees allow me to
control for downstream involvement and efficiency, respectively. The country specific measures38
include log GDP, OPEC membership, the polity variables QoGI and PRI, and time dummies.
The time dummies serve as crude oil price control variables in Eq. (10). These dummies
capture any movements in the oil price, which is the same for all firms, due to cointegrated oil
markets (Chen et al., 2009). Adding the crude oil price into the setup results in an insignificant
coefficient for the oil price and in dropping one time dummy. The coefficients β2 and β3 can be
interpreted as oil production growth rates and have the function of capturing the oil production
behavior over time for national firms and private firms, respectively, everything else held constant.
36From the discussion in the model (Section 3), it is known that the isoelastic demand requires h > 1 or otherwise
no oil production takes place. Thus, the interpretation of h at this point is difficult, and a separation between h and r
not possible.
37Additionally, the model also is applicable to a pure monopoly. However, it is not likely that all national firms
collude as a whole.
38Because population does not enter significantly into the regression model and does not influence the coefficients
of the other variables, I dropped population in order to increase the sample size.
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’Everything else’ includes any firm fixed effects which includes the expropriation date, the oil
price, the oil reserves, downstream involvement, changes in country income and changes within
political institutions. Thus, the model predictions will be captured by these two coefficients. The
model above predicts β2 < 0 in the magnitude of some discount rate and β3 to be insignificant. A
negative β2 would imply a declining production path over time. The magnitude of the coefficient
can be interpreted as the yearly percentage change in oil output (oil output growth rate). Equation
(10) includes the dummy for state-owned as a separate variable. This is necessary because some
firms exhibit state-owned within-firm variation.
7.1 The Years 1998-2010
By using the observations of the years 1998-2010, I restrict the panel to the period for which,
according to the literature (Hamilton, 2009b) and by judging the price path in Figure 2, an oil
extraction regime dictated by a Hotelling rent seems plausible. The data restriction is necessary,
since the break in the oil extraction policy of national firms, predicted by the theory, is unknown
ex-ante.39 My model further suggests that the Hotelling rent should matter only in the case of the
state-owned firms.
Before going into details, as the quintessence of this subsection, I find that, under the full set
of control variables, national firms reduce output by about 3.5 percent each year, and private firms
produce at a constant rate for the sample period 1998-2010. This indicates strong support for my
model and highlights that the main qualitative features of the model carry over to the data of the
restricted period.
The results of the regression models, including only log oil reserves and log real GDP as
covariates, are presented in Table 2, column 1. In columns 2-5, additional firm-level covariates
and the country-specific political institution measures are added. In columns 1-4, the sample is
restricted to 1998-2010, whereas column 5 uses the full sample. The dependent variable is the
average daily oil production in log. The table reports the coefficients of fixed effects estimator
regressions including time dummies and robust standard errors clustered at the firm level in all
columns. In the following, I will discuss the regression results for the restricted sample period,
starting with the base setup and subsequently add further control variables.
The first column shows the base regression with oil reserves, the state-owned dummy, real
GDP and separate time trends for private firms and state-owned firms. The results for the dummy
variable, which enters significant in most specifications with a positive coefficient, are not reported
here.
The time trend for the state-owned firms enters negative and significant at the 1 percent level.
39I will evaluate this break by proper statistical means below in Section 7.2.
25
Table 2: Fixed Effects Estimations - Sample Period 1998-2010
Dependent variable: Log oil production
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log oil 0.561** 0.550** 0.583** 0.524** 0.390**
reserves (0.060) (0.063) (0.074) (0.062) (0.041)
Time trend -0.041** -0.038** -0.039** -0.035** -0.015**
state-owned (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.004)
Time trend 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.001
private (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
Log real GDP 0.334** 0.200** 0.236** 0.190** 0.199**
(Int $) (0.061) (0.036) (0.045) (0.038) (0.038)
Log refinery 0.204** 0.205** 0.207** 0.124**
capacity (0.046) (0.050) (0.046) (0.037)
Log product 0.170** 0.183** 0.157** 0.159**
sales (0.047) (0.052) (0.047) (0.037)
Political -0.452 -0.355 -0.341**
institutions (0.327) (0.218) (0.125)
Obs. 622 530 453 530 947
adj.-R2 0.956 0.960 0.955 0.960 0.957
F-Statistic 18.522 22.547 17.209 21.913 15.257
Notes:* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. FE estimator regressions in all columns with country dummies, time dummies and
robust standard errors clustered at firm level in parentheses. Also included, but not reported, is a state-owned dummy.
This dummy is one, if state ownership is 100 percent and zero otherwise. Columns 1-5 refer to the restricted sample
period 1998-2009. Column 6 uses the full sample period. Log real GDP is in PPP adjusted international dollars.
Political institutions are measured by the Quality of Government Index in column 4 and by the Political Rights Index
in columns 5-6. Both are normalized to lie between 0 and 1, where higher values signify better institutions.
The coefficient of -0.041 states that on average a state-owned firm decreases its output by 4.1
percent per year, holding price and oil reserves constant. Within the model, this 4.1 percent would
correspond to the discount rate faced by the state-owned firms. This ballpark figure is the upper
bound as the coefficient of the state-owned firms’ time trend varies between -0.035 and -0.041
across the different regression setups of the restricted sample. However, the 4.1 percent is within
the spectrum that one would expect for an average discount rate faced by states owning national
firms. From the model, we know that national firms reduce their oil supply in order to induce an
oil price increase and accordingly generate a Hotelling rent.40
Column 1 displays an insignificant time trend coefficient for private firms, which implies that
private firms, conditional on the covariates, produce at a constant level. Thus, given, for example,
the crude oil price, private firms behave as predicted by the theoretical model which states that
private firms will not adjust their oil supply in order to generate a Hotelling rent. This behavior
is consistent with the assumption that private firms are not able to fully exploit the oil reserves in
their host countries, due to the limited time horizon.
Further, the hypothesis that the slopes of the time trends for private firms and state-owned firms
40I will show in the robustness section that the oil price does, in fact, react to the supply reduction.
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are the same can be rejected at the 5 percent significance level in all regression specifications in
this study.
I find a positive and significant relationship between log oil reserves and log oil production.
Following the point estimates in Table 2, column 1, a 1 percent increase in oil reserves leads to
an oil production increase of 0.56 percent. This first benchmark is robust to different specifica-
tions, and the effect of a firm’s oil reserves increase on the oil output remains at an elasticity of
around 0.4-0.6. As the regressions exploit within-firm variation, this relates directly to successful
oil reserve exploration or acquisitions conducted by a firm. On these terms, a declining reserve
discovery rate would translate into a production decrease. The declining time trend for national
firms, conditional on the oil reserves, is quite interesting, especially in the context of the Hubbert-
Peak debate. As Table 1 shows, there is no oil reserve shortage for these firms in absolute terms.
Yet, national firms display a declining oil production path over time, conditional on the oil price
and oil reserves. This is an important point here, since it implies that national firms, despite their
access to vast and extremely cheaply producible41 oil reserves, curb their oil production at a yearly
rate, holding the oil price constant. On the other hand, private firms which are to a great extent
confined to lower and more inaccessible oil reserves, produce at a constant rate (at the capacity
limit), holding the oil price constant. They do not curb oil supply. Within an economic context,
assuming for the moment no Hotelling regime, it would be expected that national firms would
first fully exhaust their cheap oil reserves, before private firms would exploit their expensive oil
reserves. However, we do not observe such a behavior. On the contrary, we observe that national
firms reduce their (cheap) oil supply at 4.1 percent each year, while private firms produce at their
capacity limit, despite their higher extraction costs. My theory above attributes these observations
to a Hotelling regime in the case of national firms, but not for private firms. Thus the model is able
to give economic meaning to patterns revealed by the data.
The relationship between log real GPD and oil production is significantly positive. It is impor-
tant to stress that causality is not clear-cut in this case, as more oil production is likely to increase
GDP. Nevertheless, GDP is able to explain quite a share of the within-firm variation in oil produc-
tion. One argument might be that GDP is correlated with technological progress in the respective
country.
In columns 2-5, measures for downstream involvement are included. Refinery capacity and
product sales enter significant and positive, implying a positive relationship between the expan-
sion of downstream involvement and oil production within a firm.42 Adding these firm-specific
covariates helps to control for firm-specific changes over time.43
41Especially the national firms in the Middle-East.
42See Eller et al. (2010) for further discussion.
43In regressions not reported here, I also add the logarithm of employees and revenues as control variables. Adding
these variables does not affect the coefficients of interest, but only reduces the sample size considerably. Hence they
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The inclusion of the Quality of Government Index (QoGI) as a political institution measure in
column 3 does not affect the results above. Hence, I conclude that the estimation results, which
indicate a Hotelling regime for national firms but not for private firms, do not depend on institu-
tional variation. The same effect is observed by the inclusion of the Political Rights Index (PRI) in
column 4, which is highly correlated with the QoGI, but allows a greater sample size.
According to the results in column 4, national firms realize a policy of oil stringency by curbing
the yearly output by about 3.5 percent, whereas private firms produce at a constant rate. Thus, the
data exhibits a significant reduction of the state-owned oil supply and a constant supply by private
firms, holding all else constant. These findings closely match the predictions of the theoretical
model for the sample period 1998-2010; that is, private firms produce at their constant capacity
limit, but national firms generate a Hotelling rent.
The regression in column 5 exploits the full sample period 1987-2010. The results reveal a
considerable decline in the coefficient size for the time trend of national firms. The reason for
this is a structural break in the data for the state-owned time trend. From the theoretical model
above this is to be expected, since national firms will initially produce at a constant rate and switch
afterwards to a Hotelling path.
7.2 A Structural Break in National Oil Production in 1997
In order to identify the switching point in the oil supply regime of national firms in a proper way,
it is necessary to test for a structural change in the time trend over time. I implement the test
proposed by Emerson and Kao (2000). Due to the nature of the test and because there seems no
singular structural break (no significant time trend) in the case of the private firms, the sample is
restricted to state-owned firms for the following regression setup,
Ôi,t = α+ β Yt + vi,t, (11)
where Yt is a time trend and vi,t = µi + i,t is a composite error term with a firm-specific effect and
an idiosyncratic part. Ôi,t are the residuals of a first-step regression on the state-owned firms sample
similar to the specification of Table 2, column 5, but without time trend. The null hypothesis is
H0 : βt = β ∀ t against H1 : βt =
β1 for t = 1, ..., k − 1β2 for t = k, ..., T. (12)
I use the supW1 asymptotic test statistic proposed by Emerson and Kao (2006), because the time
structure of the data is I(0).44 The results for the structural break test are depicted in Table 3. I
are dropped from the subsequent analysis.
44I can reject an augmented Dickey-Fuller test that all panels contain unit root at the 1 percent significance level.
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Table 3: Time Trend Structural Break
The sample is restricted to state-owned firms only
supW1 Critical Estimated Pre- Post-
value (1%) break year break break
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
9.47 4.36 1997 .008 -.043**
(.019) (.011)
Notes: I use the test for a structural break in the time trend proposed by Emerson and Kao
(2006). I employ the supW1 test statistic and its correspondent asymptotic critical value
for the 1% significance level. Because of the test characteristics, I perform the test on
the residuals that are obtained from a regression similar, but without time trend, to Table
2, column 6. The sample is restricted to the state-owned firms only. In the regression
estimates of columns 4-5: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 and robust standard errors clustered
at firm level in parentheses.
can reject the null hypothesis at the 1 percent significance level in the case of 1997, which implies
that the time trends before and after these break points differ statistically in the case of state-owned
firms. Indeed Table 3 reveals that the coefficients differ in sign and size before and after the break
points. In particular, the insignificant and small coefficient of the time trend for the period 1987-
1997 implies that there is no Hotelling regime observable for these early years in the case of the
national firms. Thus, the statistical test places the date of the shift from constant extraction towards
a Hotelling path, in fact, near to 1998, which is reported in the literature (Hamilton, 2009b) and is
suggested by the price path in Figure 2.45
I have, thus, established the three key points in this study in theoretical and empirical terms:
(a) private firms produce at a constant rate, holding everything else constant; (b) national firms
curb their oil supply at a yearly rate of approximately 3.5 percent since 1997 in order to generate a
Hotelling rent; (c) the Hotelling rent played no role before 1997 when national firms shifted from
constant supply towards a Hotelling regime. For (b) to hold true, it is necessary that the reduction
in oil supply of national firms does in fact affect the oil price, which I demonstrate below.
8 Robustness Checks
In this section, I first establish that the results above are robust to the differentiation in oil reserves
between national and private firms. I then show that the Hotelling behavior of national firms is
not driven exclusively by the OPEC members, but is attributable homogeneously to national firms.
The latter point also helps to evaluate whether OPEC exerts market power by exclusive supply
reduction. That would complicate the translation of the analytic results to the data.46 Finally, I
45Note, that the match between price path and the break in the time trend is not trivial, since the data captures yearly
oil production rates.
46Since the model results are not applicable to a market with some market power; e.g., Stackelberg competition, but
only to a competitive market or a pure monopoly.
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deliver empirical support for a crucial condition that has to be met, in order to assure that my
theoretical model is applicable to the data. That is, the supply contraction needs to have an effect
on the oil price or otherwise no Hotelling rent can be generated.
8.1 Differences in Oil Reserves
It might be that differences in the time trend between state-owned and private firms is driven by
some cross effect, due to diverging reactions to changes in oil reserves.47 For example, state-owned
firms might develop their oil reserves at a slower pace. Table 4, column 1 (labeled oil reserves),
shows that the separation of oil reserves for national and private firms do not affect the coefficients
of the time trends. National firms still successively reduce their oil supply by 3.4 percent each
year, and private firms produce at a constant rate. Nevertheless, the log oil reserves coefficient
of private firms exceeds its national counterpart, indicating that private firms produce at a higher
pace. However, it is not possible to reject the Wald-test that both coefficients are equal at the 5
percent level, which does not support the separation of the coefficients on statistical grounds.
8.2 OPEC
In this subsection, I extend the data analysis by investigating whether the observed behavior of the
national firms is determined solely by the sub-group OPEC, which would imply that the variance
in the OPEC observations drives the results of the national firms and would imply a considerable
market power of the OPEC.
To this end, I separate the OPEC group of firms, which consists throughout of state-owned
firms, from the rest of the state-owned firms. Thus, for now, the state-owned group does not contain
the firms within the OPEC group. Then both groups are endowed with a separate time trend. Table
4, column 2, shows the results. Here the time trend coefficient of the OPEC group tops its state-
owned counterpart quantitatively, implying a greater discount rate for the OPEC group. However,
following the Wald-test, it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that the coefficients of these two
groups are the same. The same holds true in column 3, where, additionally, a separate slope for
OPEC oil reserves is introduced. Indeed, the time trends between OPEC and state-owned firms
converge considerably in column 3, indicating differences in the pace of oil reserve development.
I cannot reject the hypothesis that the OPEC firms differ with respect to the oil reserves of the
other oil firms marginally at the 5 percent level, even though the OPEC coefficient is greater in
quantitative terms. I conclude that the OPEC group of firms behaves similar to other state-owned
firms by reducing their oil supply at a yearly rate of about 3.5 percent, but might differ at the rate
47I do not report the results for control variables already discussed in Section 7.1. These coefficients mostly enter
into the regression in a manner similar to Table 2.
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Table 4: Regression Results - Oil Reserves and OPEC (1998-2010)
Dependent Variable: Log Oil Production
(1) (2) (3)
Time trend -0.034** -0.039** -0.038**
state-owned (0.007) (0.011) (0.010)
Time trend 0.006 0.006 0.006
private (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Oil reserves OPEC
Time trend -0.028** -0.035**
OPEC (0.008) (0.009)
State-owned 0.455** OPEC 0.856**
oil reserves (0.083) oil reserves (0.216)
Private 0.607** Non-OPEC 0.417**
oil reserves (0.063) oil reserves (0.061)
Obs. 530 530 530
adj.-R2 0.961 0.961 0.963
F-Statistic 26.780 23.855 24.691
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. FE estimator regressions in all columns with country dummies, time
dummies and robust standard errors clustered at firm level in parentheses. The sample period is 1998-2010.
In all columns a state-owned dummy, log Refinery Capacity, log Product Sales, the PRI measure and log
GDP (int $) are included, but not reported. The models of columns 2-3 include an OPEC dummy, and
column 2 also the log oil reserves (not reported). For the columns 2-3 I cannot reject, at the 10% level, the
H0: the coefficients are the same in case of the time trends for OPEC and state-owned firms.
of development of their oil reserves, holding all else constant. The latter point also might reflect
the more easily accessible oil reserves of the OPEC.
Respectively, by reversing the argument, I find that the Hotelling path of a declining oil supply
is characteristic for state-owned firms in general, and not characteristic for a special sub-group. It
is not characteristic of private firms as the results confirm. This is good news, since it also implies
that OPEC does not act as a monopolist and, hence, indicates a market structure of competitive
national firms.48 Thus, in the following, the OPEC group of firms is included into the set of state-
owned firms again.
8.3 National Oil Supply and Oil Price
A further possibility to test the consistency of the theoretical and empirical findings is to reverse
the argument of the relation between the Hotelling rent and the oil supply of national companies.
The Hotelling rent in the model can only be realized by a reduction in supply and the resulting
increase in the oil price. Following this line of reasoning, the data should exhibit a negative rela-
tionship between the oil supply provided by national firms and the oil price for the post-1997 years.
A reduction in the state-owned oil supply, holding everything else constant, should result in an ob-
servable price effect which generates the Hotelling rent. In the context of the regression setup in
48This results coincides with the findings of Lin (2011) who finds no OPEC market power after 1990.
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Table 5: The Oil Price and Oil Supply
Explanatory Variables
Obs. State-owned Private
price effect price effect
Sample restricted to 574 -.004** 0.000
post 1997 (0.001) (0.000)
Sample restricted to 373 0.002 -.008
pre 1998 (0.005) (0.005)
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. The dependent variable is log oil production. FE estimator
regressions in all columns with country dummies and robust standard errors clustered at firm level
in parentheses. The post 1997 sample is restricted to 1998-2010 in row 1. The sample in row 2 is
restricted to 1987-1997. In all columns, a state-owned dummy, log refinery capacity, log product
sales, the PRI measure and log GDP (int dollars) are included, but not reported. I can reject, at
the 1% level, the H0: the coefficients are the same in case of the price effects in row 1, but cannot
reject the hypothesis at the 10% level for row 2.
Eq. 10, the price effect would become noticeable, when removing the time dummies which control
for the average yearly oil price.
On the other hand, the effect should not be observable before 1997, because state-owned firms
shifted towards a Hotelling regime after 1997 and produced at a constant level before. Thus,
reversing the argument, I substitute separate oil price effects for private and state-owned firms for
the respective time trends in Eq. 10 and drop the time dummies. Table 5, row 1, confirms a negative
covariance for the oil price and the oil supply for national firms in the sample 1997-2010. Utilizing
the Wald-test, I can reject the hypothesis that the coefficients of the private and the national firms
are the same at the 1 percent level. In turn, restriction of the sample to pre-1997 in column 2
reveals that the effect vanishes, and I cannot reject the hypothesis of similar coefficients. Hence, I
conclude that national oil firms affect the oil price and thereby generate a scarcity rent after 1997,
but do not follow such a regime before 1997. This closes the argument lined out in this study.
9 Conclusions
Oil is fundamental in large areas of economic activity. As the oil price rises and demand from
developing economies, like China and India, increases, the question of supply is at hand. This
paper identifies differences between private and national firms in terms of oil production as the
major determinant driving the dynamic behavior of the world oil supply. I find that national firms
have pursued a policy of oil supply stringency since 1997 in order to generate a Hotelling rent,
whereas private firms have not. Thus, national firms restrict their oil supply to induce an oil price
increase. Given that national firms provide the major share of the world oil supply and own more
than 90 percent of all proven oil reserves, this finding contributes to a deeper understanding of
the oil market and oil price development. I further present empirical evidence that the Hotelling
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regime is a more recent phenomenon and was not observable before 1997.
Guided by my extension of the Hotelling model that allows for differentiation with respect to
private and state-owned firms, I present evidence that state-owned firms reduce their output at a
yearly rate of about 3.5 percent. The data does not reveal that private firms adopt this behavior, but
exhibits, ceteris paribus, a constant output for this group. In the model, the behavior of state-owned
firms is driven by the scarcity rent, which plays no role in the behavior of private firms, because the
latter face an expropriation date and hence do not expect to fully exhaust the oil reserves of their
host countries. Thus, national firms generate revenues by limiting their output, which increases the
oil price. I demonstrate that this carries over to the data, which confirm that a reduction in the oil
supply by national firms raises the oil price.
My theory also suggests that national firms do not immediately switch towards a Hotelling
regime after formation, but initially produce at a constant rate, due to the capacity limit constraint.
That is reflected in the data, which show that national firms, which mostly emerged owing to
expropriation in the 1970s, did not follow a Hotelling regime before 1997. These results are robust
when controlling for firm- and country-specific variables. Due to the heterogeneous nature of their
behavior, a shift from private to state-owned firms’ oil market dominance has lead eventually (in
1997) to a shift from cheap to expensive oil. I conduct several robustness checks that show that
the empirical results do not depend on specific regression setups and that the theory is applicable
to the data.
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Proof of Lemma1 We see that ∂uF (t)∂t < 0 and ∃ t = TS(F ) : uF (t) = KF . The latter point
has to be true in order for KF to be optimal. It follows, by continuity of the interior solution,
that uF (t) = KF ∀t ∈ [0, TS(F )] and, because uF (t) decreases with e−h r t, it is possible to write
uF (t) = e
−h r (t−TS(F ))KF ∀t ∈ [TS(F ), T ]. Thus, the point TS(F ) is a switching point for the firm.
Lemma 2. The value function VF is positive as long as g < 1 holds.
Proof. To prove this Lemma, it is sufficient to substitute the solution for the sunk investment
K˜F =
(
B (1−g)Y e−r T (er T−1)
rΦ
)h
and the extraction rate in VF > 0. This leads to
Bh (1− g)h r−h Y h Φ−h (1− e−r T )h > 0, (13)
which is true for g < 1.
Lemma 3. Assuming that Kmax ≥ K˜F |inf {T :T= X0
K˜F
} g
1
Y and
inf {T : T = X0
K˜F
} > Kmaxa + 1h r , where K˜F |inf {T :T= X0
K˜F
} is the maximum value K˜F can assume
for a finite expropriation date and Kmaxa is the time until Kmax is reached, then it follows that
T˜ ∈ [0, Kmaxa ] and thus the domain of Eq. (8) is bounded on T ∈ [0, Kmaxa ].
Proof. To prove Lemma 3, it is sufficient to show that if it is not optimal to expropriate until
Kmax is reached, the state will expropriate at T = Kmaxa . This becomes obvious by comparing the
following integrals:
V 2L ≥ V 2L =
∫ T= X0
K˜F
Kmax
a
BKYmax e
−r t dt ≥ V̂ =
∫ T= X0
K˜F
Kmax
a
B gK˜YF e
−r t dt, (14)
where the first integral is the discounted income from state-owned oil extraction, starting at time
t = Kmaxa until the expropriation date T =
X0
K˜F
. The second integral denotes the discounted ’tax-
only’ income over the same interval. At T = X0
K˜F
, the oil stock is exhausted for V̂ . Because of
the assumptions of Lemma 3 and Kmax ≤ K˜F , V̂ is always feasible by expropriating at t = Kmaxa .
However, optimality requires a declining extraction path and thus V 2L ≥ V
2
L, due to the discount
rate. Note that the inequality of Eq. (14) holds for an arbitrary expropriation date T > Kmaxa . Thus,
the domain is bounded. Lemma 3 also shows that optimality requires X|T<∞ > 0.
Lemma 4. There exists a T˜ for which V 2L (T˜ ) > 0 is true.
Proof. It is sufficient to show that at least ∃T : V 2L (T ) > 0. Substituting for T = X0KF in Eq. (8)
yields:
g ≥ 0 ∧ h > e 1h (h− 1) =⇒ V 2L (
X0
KF
) > 0, (15)
which is true as long as h does not tend to infinity.
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Lemma 5. There exists an optimal g which maximizes Eq. (8).
Proof. The domain of Eq. (8), with respect to g, is bounded on g ∈ [0, 1], because outside this
interval neither the state nor the firm will participate. Furthermore, the value function is continuous
and differentiable in g, V 2L |g=0 = V 2L |g=1 = 0, and it can be shown that the derivative V 2L |g=0 > 0.
Thus, by the interior extremum- and Rolle’s theorem, the maximum g˜ is reached in the interior of
the interval and exists.
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Figure 2: Casual interpretation of the historical oil price in the contex of the theoretical model
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